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Abstract
Popular sovereignty is the salient theme of James Wilson’s political thought. But Wilson is no less
eager to prove that the sovereign people can oblige and bind themselves, or that liberty is consistent
with law. He rests his case on a Thomistic view of natural law as reflected in Scottish Common-Sense
philosophy; he also utilizes several of the “auxiliary precautions” of Federalism. However, he parts
company with his Federalist brethren over the question of representation, and he anticipates a fair
degree of republican virtue as a consequence of the act of voting. He further supposes that the people
can be trusted to legislate because their interests are homogeneous. In the end, Wilson’s democratic
sympathies clash with his aristocratic penchant for reputation and honor.

Popular Sovereignty and Political Obligation in the Thought of James Wilson

In his opening address of the Lectures on Law, James Wilson avers his special regard for
the American nation, a country young and untried but certain to surpass the fabled commonwealths
of antiquity: “Were I called upon for my reasons why I deem so highly of the American character,
I would assign them in a very few words—That character has been eminently distinguished by the
love of liberty, and the love of law.”1 Although liberty and law are contending objects of affection,
one without the other, Wilson explains, is politically ruinous, issuing in anarchical licentiousness
or tyrannical oppression (72).2 America has achieved, or perhaps has always enjoyed, a balanced
harmony of the two. But neither revolutionary patriotism nor constitutional sagacity can guarantee
this balance into the future unless the population is properly instructed respecting the origins and
requirements of liberty and law. Insofar as Wilson undertakes to provide this instruction, he
presents himself as the teacher of the nation and the preserver of its republican character.
From the principle of liberty, one derives what surely is the core of Wilson’s thought,
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namely, the sovereignty of the people. From the principle of law, one discovers what arguably is
the problem of Wilson’s thought, namely, the restraint of popular rule. People are free, and yet
they are obliged. How Wilson concludes the first and establishes the second will be the subject of
this paper, and the Law Lectures will serve as the primary, though by no means the only, source.

I. Popular Sovereignty
Wilson’s interest in the question of sovereignty is indeed remarkable, especially in light of
the Federalist Papers and its near silence concerning this matter.3 Three of the most important
chapters of the Lectures on Law raise and extensively discuss the subject of final authority,4 and
countless reaffirmations of the conclusions therein are scattered throughout the whole. Wilson was
a Scottish émigré of 1765 who quickly thrust himself into the debates of the resistance period. The
unavoidable preoccupation of that period with the issue of sovereign power is something which
stayed with Wilson through the drafting of the Constitution and even as he wrote his Law Lectures
in 1790-1791.
Wilson accepts from Sir William Blackstone, his chief antagonist in the work, that
sovereignty is “supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority” and that it is located in
every state (169, 770).5 But he disputes Blackstone’s claim, based on Pufendorf and ultimately on
Hobbes (105), that supremacy is a function of power, and that law is the command of the sovereign.
Wilson’s response to the legal positivism of his day is reminiscent of arguments found in Rousseau
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and Locke: Superior force can compel, says Wilson, but it entails no obligation to obey; on the
contrary, “resistance to such force is a right, and, if resistance can prove effectual, it is a duty also”
(127, 106)6 Furthermore, total subjection to another’s will is an excessive and unnecessary price
for peace. Wilson queries, “Must submission to an equal be the yoke, under which we must pass,
before we can diffuse the mild power, or participate in the benign influence of law? If such is
indeed our fate, let resignation be our aim” (114). Nothing is gained by forgetting the ends of civil
life—the happiness of the people—by treating government as unaccountable, or by enslaving
oneself to its authority. In the first place, the individual has no such power to give, and if he did,
the association subsisting between rulers and ruled would be “neither [a] commonwealth nor [a]
body politick” (115). Finally, if law is a command from above instead of an agreement among
equals, then, Wilson warns, “we may bid a last adieu to the maxim which I have always deemed
of prime importance in the science of government and human laws—a free people are governed
by laws, of which they approve” (179).7
Hobbes’ argument supposes that people are naturally equal and that the sovereign is an
artificial being made great by the submission of others.8 The result, as Wilson sees it, is servility
for all: “in the attempt to make one person more than man, millions must be made less” (115). 9
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But an alternate account of the origin of sovereign power would derive it from the natural
superiority of one or more people. This is a position which Wilson traces to Aristotle, whom
Wilson respectfully begs leave to challenge. There are practical objections to a distributive justice
which elevates to king anyone “excelling in all virtues.” The contingency of, “if a man can be
found,” is a most improbable and uncertain foundation for civil government. Also, the gradations
of inequality among citizens would necessitate a similarly complicated system of rule. And
experience teaches that the political recognition of excellence generally has a corrupting influence
on those esteemed (106-08). Wilson does not deny that some people are superior in talent,
accomplishment, and virtue. But he doubts the political relevance of this fact. After all, it is not
clear what relation a superior person has to his fellows, whether he is aloof and disinterested or
actively engaged for the benefit of others. Wilson puts this as a question, almost as if a positive
reply would result in the surrender of power to a king (128). But it is more accurate to say that
Wilson’s solution to the “Aristotle problem” is the privatization of excellence. This statement is
not meant to imply that virtue is individualistic and arbitrary, for Wilson is a natural-law adherent
who denounces moral relativism and skeptical philosophy (139, 216-18). Rather, Wilson maintains
that the private is the end for which the public is the means. Politics is but a scaffolding thrown up
to erect the more enduring edifice of society (86, 608). Wilson draws a sharp distinction between
political life, or government, the purpose of which is to secure and enlarge the rights of men; and
social life, especially domestic society, the purpose of which is to promote human excellence, more
commonly called happiness (238-39, 285, 592). In this respect, Wilson solves his “Aristotle

master” (Power versus Liberty: Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson [University of Virginia Press, 2000], p.
108; also p. 116).
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problem” by adopting Aristotle’s eudaemonic mode of thought. Consider, for example, this
Aristotelian statement from Wilson’s July Fourth Oration of 1788:
Agriculture, manufactures, and commerce will ensure to us plenty, convenience,
and elegance. But is there not something still wanting to finish the man? Are
internal virtues and accomplishments less estimable, or less attracting than external
arts and ornaments?
The government’s role in fostering moral and intellectual virtue is definite but indirect. By
protecting the rights of property, liberty, and subsistence, government produces the serenity of
mind in which “the sciences and the virtues love to dwell” (776).10 The crucial point though is that
developed virtue contains its own happiness, that such happiness is private, and that while
deserving of honor, it need not be obeyed (128). Virtue is the crown and glory of society, but
equality is the bedrock of politics.
Superiority can be divinely ordained, and kings have frequently claimed a divine right to
rule. But such a notion, Wilson contends, was originally seized upon as a secular defense against
papal plenitude of power; thus, it is not to be taken too seriously (120-21). Second, superiority can
arise from nature; but, as just explained, such excellence finds its rightful home in the private
regions of society. Since neither God nor nature determines the superior few—at least not in any
reliable and relevant way—only human authority can supply their number, and not by forced
submission, since force confers no right, but by voluntary agreement. In the absence of divine
election, human election is the sole legitimate means for constituting political power (121, 180,
187).
Something of Aristotle has been detected in Wilson, but at bottom his principles are more
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Lockean. Why must political power proceed from human election? Because men are equal in
nature and in pre-governmental civil society. They are equal in their possession of natural rights
and in their obligations to natural law. They differ in their attributes and dispositions, and social
life depends precisely on this diversity and on the division of labor which it engenders. But in the
right to be treated fairly and to enjoy the products of their work, the wise and the ignorant, the
weak and the artful all stand on an equal footing. Men also are free, since as a consequence of their
equality none are superior, and none subordinate (241). Free and equal human beings combine to
form society on the basis of unanimous consent and thereafter institute government on the basis of
majority consent. As creators of civil government, the people collectively are its sovereign, just as
the creator God is sovereign of the universe. They maintain government, supervise it, and have the
residual right to alter or abolish it, even the right of revolution (77, 156, 304).11 Here Wilson’s
Lockeanism is unmistakable, for these are the very arguments used by Locke to defeat the
absolutism of Hobbes.
Wilson, however, confronts a somewhat milder variant of absolutism, namely Blackstone’s
asseverations concerning parliamentary sovereignty. Blackstone is twice quoted dismissing the
opinion of Locke that “there remains still inherent in the people a supreme power to alter the
legislature.” Such a view, says Blackstone, while theoretically just, cannot be adopted nor argued
from “under any dispensation of government at present actually existing” (77, 169). Lest
revolution occur, and with that society suffer destruction and all positive law suffer repeal,
sovereign power must be removed from the people—a la Hobbes—and located in a mixed and
differentiated parliament—a la the Glorious Revolution.
Wilson is at pains to contest the argument for parliamentary sovereignty, even as a true
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account of the constitution of Great Britain, offering instead common law as evidence of popular
consent (170, 182-85). But at other times, Wilson concedes the sovereignty of parliament (309,
770), only to compare it unfavorably to popular sovereignty in the United States. The American
people have the distinction of being the first to infuse the whole of government with the principle
of representation (312, 402, 763). All branches are elected or trace their power back to the people.
Hence supervisory control is exerted by the people and sovereignty effectively retained. In Britain,
by contrast, the king as executive is contractually joined to the people rather than delegated to act
in their name; the House of Lords represents no one but the Peers assembled; and the Commons
has its representative character vitiated by corruption, malapportionment, insufficient numbers,
and over-long terms of office (175-76, 311-13, 763). Also in America, the division of power works
as a check upon the legislative authority, especially the judicial branch empowered to review the
constitutionality of laws (330). 12 Wilson even hazards the first defense of civil disobedience,
saying that a further check may be applied by the individual’s rightful refusal to obey legislative
enactments thought to be unconstitutional (186).13
The people are sovereign in America because through their representatives they legislate
for themselves. Law is an expression of popular consent rather than a command of superiors. But
the rule of law exists only if people are bound, and it is not immediately evident that people can
bind themselves. Pufendorf is cited as someone who disputes the possibility of self-binding, for in
the absence of superior force to maintain agreements and police the law, self-bound individuals
will quickly renounce their obligations (188). Where then is the obligation if people are obliged
only for as long as they care to be obliged? Wilson himself seems alert to the force of this question,

12

Ibid., pp. 304-05, 354.

13

There is the proviso that the individual be prepared to suffer the consequences of a wrong judgment.

7

for in speaking later of the legislature, he says,
Let us suppose, that this single body, in a lucky moment, should pass a law to
restrain itself: in the next moment, an unlucky one, it might repeal the restraining
law. Any mounds, which it might raise to confine itself, would still be within the
sphere of its own motion; and whatever force should impel it, would necessarily
impel those mounds along with it. To stop and to check, as well as to produce
motion in this political globe we must possess—what Archimedes wanted—
another globe to stand upon (291).14
To the degree that the legislature is viewed as a distinct social body, as is often the case with Whig
republicanism,15 the people can function as “another globe to stand upon.” But a representative
legislature, as Wilson would have it, places government and people on the same globe with no
separate ground from which to lever their collective will. Thus, the people binding themselves are
essentially unbound—a woeful conclusion which necessitates returning to the jurisprudence of
Pufendorf and Hobbes to explain the sources of obligation and the nature of law. But their position
is an anathema to Wilson who reiterates his belief that “one man, equal and free, cannot be bound
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by another, who is no more.” At stake is “the fate of all human laws,” for “if a man cannot bind
himself no human authority can bind him” (188).

II. Political Obligation
Popular restraint is a significant problem for Wilson because he takes to heart the people’s
sovereign right to rule. Robert McCloskey calls him “one of the most consistent democrats of his
era.” 16 At the Federal Convention, he was singularly ardent in proposing and defending
majoritarian measures. He recommended, for instance: (1) that the House, the Senate, and the
executive have their members elected by direct, popular vote; (2) that representation in the Senate
be in proportion to population; (3) that House elections be annual; (4) that new states to the union
be accorded the same privileges as founding members; (5) that age qualifications for office-holding
be eliminated and citizenship requirements reduced; (6) that bare or barely super majorities be
sufficient for navigation legislation, for ratification of the Constitution, and for ratification of
treaties—and in this last business that the House be involved; also (7), that constitutional
ratification be the work of special conventions, popularly elected, instead of sitting legislatures.17
And there are other proposals in the same vein. Wilson did more than anyone at the Convention to
bring democracy into the Constitution. For this, subsequent generations might well be grateful;18
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but such democratic ardor also places him under a peculiar obligation to explain how popular
sovereignty is to control itself, for the final objective is lawfulness no less than liberty.

1. The Law of Nature
In a speech delivered before the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention in November of 1787,
Wilson had this statement to make:
. . . that the supreme power resides in the people . . . may be called the panacea in
politicks. There can be no disorder in the community but may here receive a radical
cure. If the errour be in the legislature, it may be corrected by the constitution; if in
the constitution, it may be corrected by the people. There is a remedy, therefore, for
every distemper in government, if the people are not wanting to themselves. For a
people wanting to themselves, there is no remedy: from their power, as we have
seen, there is no appeal: to their errour, there is no superior principle of correction
(771).19
Wilson though would allow as an exception to popular sovereignty the correcting restraints of
natural law. Wilson is a natural-law theorist. But as with all natural-law theories, the question
arises whether this law is known by men, whether human behavior normally, i.e., “naturally,”
comports with it, and whether deviations therefrom are punished and the law as a whole upheld—
because nature conceived as lawful is something more rigorous than nature conceived as orderly,
which order intelligent beings are called upon to acknowledge and glorify. Wilson does answer in
the affirmative respecting the first part of the question (known by), but respecting the other two,
his answer—less substantial and deliberate—is somewhat difficult to ascertain.
Among equals, Wilson explains, obligation must rightfully proceed from consent. But
equal people are still not free to obligate themselves to any course of action they choose, because
they are dependent beings and owe obedience to God their creator, who is all wise, all good, and
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all powerful. God, says Wilson, is the efficient cause of moral obligation (132). His will, expressed
through nature—and sometimes through revelation—establishes the parameters within which
human will operates; it also supplies direction and sanction for positive law. But to be obligatory,
God’s will must be known. Wilson contends that God’s will is not known primarily by reason or
by faith, which is to say that it is not the province of philosophers or believers. Rather, all humans
equally possess the capacity to receive and be guided by divine instruction. This capacity Wilson
terms the moral sense, although other denominations include conscience, feeling, intuition,
common sense, instinct, sentiment, and affection. Wilson is an exponent of Scottish CommonSense philosophy, a school of thought whose most prominent members are Francis Hutcheson,
Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and Thomas Reid.20 Scottish Common Sense, as mediated through
Wilson, holds that morality, like mathematics, begins in and depends on intuited, indemonstrable
first principles. Wilson does not brave presenting a comprehensive list of these axiomatic truths,21
but he does offer as examples truth-telling and protection of the innocent (232-33). First principles,
it happens, are felt rather than discovered rationally: “How do you know that you ought to do that
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which your conscience enjoins the performance? I can only say, I feel that such is my duty.” People
must first feel the evil of injuring the innocent before they can reason about their precise
obligations. “If a person was not possessed” of such feeling, “it would not be in the power of
arguments, to give him any conception of the distinction between right and wrong” (133). The role
of reason in moral deliberation is thus instrumental—it determines the means appropriate to ends
given by the moral sense. More completely, reason is responsible for proving, extending, and
applying what the moral sense has suggested; for rendering exact what moral sense has left unclear;
for considering relations and tracing out remote consequences; and for establishing priorities
among the rights of men (138). So described, reason seems to hold the same subordinate station
that Aristotle allots to prudence in its relation to virtue. Aristotle’s virtue is also an intuitive sense
of right and wrong, of noble and base, buttressed by habituation and brought to perfection by the
means-reasoning of prudence.22 At the same time, Wilson’s moral sense bears this comparison
with Plato, that it relies heavily on the “sentiment of beauty and deformity” (143, 134) and so looks
like the moral instruction which Socrates tenders to his warriors, who are wont to obey the
philosopher-king because he is perceived to be the supreme object of beauty (by contrast, the
philosophers of the Republic are directed by the love of the good, the Agathon). 23 But surely
Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on conscience would seem to provide the original for Wilson, who
says, in keeping with Aquinas, “As virtue is the business of all men, the first principles of it are
written on their hearts, in characters so legible, that no man can pretend ignorance of them, or of
his obligations to practice them” (136-37).24
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The moral sense is the faculty by which people learn the will of God as communicated by
the law of nature. The law of nature is obligatory. Wilson regards it as the other side of natural
right. If people have a right to life, liberty, property, and a reputation honestly earned,25 they also
have an obligation to respect these rights in others. Wilson is especially expansive on the subject
when speaking of the law of nations, or natural law applied to states. A nation lies under the
obligation to do no wrong or injury, not as an indirect consequence of actions taken or in the proper
assertion of its rights, but as “the governing principle of its conduct” (160). Moreover, a nation,
like an individual, is commanded by natural law to do good to others. The obligation is strictest
respecting the nation’s own well-being (making obligation the same as right) and that of nations
nearby; it weakens proportionally as those removed and foreign are comprehended by it. But still
some duties are owed to all of mankind. Wilson considers it an obligation inherent in human nature
that people—and that people united as nations—develop their powers of moral abstraction,
expanding ever more the circle of friends and neighbors to whom solicitous attention is extended.
It is the great achievement of civilization that collective behavior has become progressively more
sociable, benevolent, and philanthropic. Indeed, Wilson waxes ebullient when he reflects on the
further progress the human race is set to achieve (160-65).
But do people, to say nothing of nations, generally discharge these obligations, and is there
a price to be paid by those who evade their duties? These are the questions previously asked
concerning the law-likeness of natural law. Wilson’s response, it must be said, is not altogether
satisfying and is perhaps circular. On the one hand, Wilson detects certain properties or capacities
which mark men as uniquely suited to civil life. “The Author of our existence,” he says, “intended
us to be social beings; and has, for that end, given us social intellectual powers” (230). These
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include language and the particular use of it for testifying, commanding, and promising; as well as
advising, persuading, consoling, encouraging, soothing, and restraining—all operations which
presuppose the company of others. In addition, the human being is possessed of social passions:
sexual love, family affection, friendship, esteem, gratitude, benevolence, patriotism, and humanity.
In part, Wilson’s argument is Aristotelian: there must be society—and society must therefore be
natural—because people have these attributes which only society can develop. At the same time,
Wilson contends that there must be these attributes because civil society in the absence of them
would be too dangerous to maintain (232). Here then is the apparent circularity: Wilson both
derives society from the possibilities of human nature and human nature from the requirements of
society. Accordingly, what is fundamental and what derivative is unclear. But as to the questions
above, the mutual dependence of society need not detract from the assumed propensity of the
human race to conduct itself decently. Those gregarious tendencies given by nature are simply
augmented by society (139-40). Such a conclusion would be consistent with Wilson’s
progressivism.
This largely Aristotelian account of the naturalness of society and of the civility of man
might, however, be supplanted by a Hobbesian alternative, to wit: proud, diffident, and fearful
people associate for the purpose of security and the safe exercise of rights, and their union is
upheld, less by social inclinations and agreeable instincts, than by the strong arm of a sovereign.
Society is indeed dangerous to maintain, for which reason power must be concentrated. Wilson is
loath to acknowledge any such Hobbesian features, denying in particular that the state of nature is
characterized by selfishness, discord, and war (228). But he also offers a Hobbesian explanation
of why men quit their natural state and join together in civil society:
Amidst this universal independence, the dissensions and animosities between the
interfering members of society, would be numerous and ungovernable. The
14

consequence would be, that each member, in such a natural state, would enjoy less
liberty, and suffer more interruption and inconvenience, than he would under a civil
government (285; also 765).
“Universal independence,” it should be observed, is not for Wilson the same thing as natural
liberty. (Wilson involves himself in a protracted and mostly semantic debate with Edmund Burke
as to whether natural liberty is surrendered to or preserved by civil society [586-92].) On the
contrary, natural liberty is just by definition, and serves as the foundation of civil liberty, because
it operates under the constraints of natural law. But how does natural liberty, restrained and
directed by natural law, degenerate into universal independence? If people are typically just,
benevolent, and grateful, why would their independence discombobulate the state of nature? Often
Wilson posits that people are predisposed to live by natural law, as when he says, “Deeply laid in
human nature, we now behold the basis of one of the principal pillars of municipal law; that which
enforces the obligations of promises, agreements, and engagements” (232; also 191). But in the
end his position appears to be that the moral sense is not so powerful an inclination, nor a selfenforcing one, except by the joys and pangs of conscience (141). A clear conscience, Wilson
affirms, is important to human happiness, a guilty conscience a deterrent to some wrongdoing.
Wilson, it is safe to say, is an optimist in his assessment of human nature. But he is not a utopian.
“In the science of politicks, we consider not so much what man ought to be, as what he really is”
(390). And what he really is, by Wilson's lights, is a rational creature who intuits the moral law,
but whose passions can overrule his intuition and whose reason too often fails him (291, 140-41).26
Accordingly, external assistance is called for, which it is the business of the municipal law to
supply: the great end of law is “to punish, and, by punishing, to prevent . . . violations of property
and of personal security” (233).
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It seems then that Wilson’s interest in the law of nature is not to find therein an effective
law which determines behavior and punishes injustice, or a state of nature which is self-regulating,
or a human nature which is unsullied and preternaturally good. There is, as noted, some of this at
work. But his dominant concern is to discover in human nature a standard of right which can guide
the lawmaking of civil society. By so doing, he means to combat the skepticism emanating from
the Enlightenment and depriving the rights of man of their foundation in nature.27 This is Wilson’s
qualified Aristotelianism. But because nature’s standard is accessible to all through the medium of
moral sense, it additionally affords a moral argument for democratic self-rule; and this is Wilson’s
Thomistic Lockeanism, or his Scottish sentimentalism.

2. Government and Citizenship
Natural law does not settle the question of whether man is able to bind himself, because
natural law is divinely ordained. But natural law in the end takes its efficacy from human law, over
which man has final control. Can then this human law have strength and constancy enough to bind,
without negating the liberty of those who make it?
One place to begin is with the principle of consent. “All human laws should be founded on
the consent of those, who obey them,” says Wilson (180). But consent can be registered in a variety
of ways: by approbation, ratification, experience. Wilson makes a point of arguing that custom is
a form of active, popular consent rather than a habit of obedience (102, 122-23). Apparently then,
the consent of the governed does not require lawmaking by referendum. And in the matter of
majority rule, Wilson adopts the traditional position that the dissenting minority has given its
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consent at an earlier stage: “But it is to be remembered, that society is constituted for a certain
purpose; and that each member of it consents that this purpose shall be carried on; and,
consequently, that everything necessary for carrying it on shall be done” (242). Among the things
necessary, of course, is majority rule, since unanimity is beyond reach, and since the minority is
less likely than the majority to be correct in their opinions and less likely to embody the common
interest (243). The first of these latter points connects with Wilson’s central claim that the moral
sense is equally distributed among men and is the greater part of moral judgment (143).28
To allow for tacit consent is to place the people at one remove from direct participation
and so to provide law with a beginning measure of insulation. For other such checks, one must
look to the Constitution which Wilson helped to draft and in Pennsylvania was called upon to
defend. Wilson pays special attention to bicameralism (an institution which came late to
Pennsylvania) and the separation of powers. The division of the legislature into two chambers is
the accepted means for preventing the abuse of its power. And abuse is to be expected since
“passions and prejudices [are not] less frequently to be found in publick bodies, than in
individuals” (291). This is a check consistent with popular sovereignty because the Senate is a
popularly constituted body, even though elected by state legislatures. (The Senate cannot represent
state sovereignty, as some think, for only the people are sovereign.) Unlike the British House of
Lords, the Senate derives its powers from the people. Nevertheless, its esprit du corps, its physical
separation from the House, its peculiar powers, longer tenure, and fewer numbers, all ensure that,
despite a common origin in the people, the Senate will develop a character of its own; as such it
will preserve the usefulness of bicameralism (414-15). The Senate’s function is to restrain the
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exuberance of the House, but also to dispel its apathy. Wilson seems here to treat the government
almost like a mixed regime in which wisdom is supplied by the Senate, goodness by the House,
and energy by the executive (290, 303).29 But for the most part wisdom is a consequence of delay
and repetition (791). With two chambers, there are two chances, and if one chamber strays from
the principles of the Constitution, the other is available to call it back. “There is not in the whole
science of politicks a more solid or a more important maxim than this—that of all governments,
those are the best, which by the natural effect of their constitutions, are frequently renewed or
drawn back to their first principles” (291). This is the work of bicameralism.
Regarding the separation of powers, Wilson asserts—following Federalist opinion of the
day—that separation does not mean isolation and autonomy. Independence is ensured if the full
powers of one branch are not placed in the hands of another, and if the proceedings of each branch
are beyond interference from either of the other two. Once decisions are taken, however, outside
influence is properly brought to bear, producing the mutual dependency among the branches
known as checks and balances (298-99).30
Wilson’s chief purpose is to explain why the executive and the judiciary are coequal,
democratic branches and why suspicion directed toward them is misplaced. Having grown
accustomed to monarchy during the colonial years, and to royally appointed governors and judges,
the American people harbor a prejudice against these branches, while retaining a Whiggish
affection for their legislatures. But again, all branches derive their authority from the people, and
so all branches are deserving of equal trust. Thus, the executive branch can be energetic and the
courts empowered with judicial review, and singly or combined they can resist the legislature,
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without the democratic character of the Constitution suffering compromise. But in point of fact,
the electorate does not have direct control over the executive, and the court, although ultimately
dependent on the people, is, for the sake of justice, set apart from “every veering gale of politicks”
(297). By presenting the executive and judicial branches as representative institutions equal to the
legislature, and by making all three branches share equally the confidence of the people, Wilson
has introduced checking devices under the cover of democracy. In the name of the people, the
president and court can obstruct the will of the Congress, of the only body actually elected by the
people. Publius, in Federalist 78, similarly dons the mantle of popular sovereignty to explain the
court’s exercise of judicial review: this is not a power which places the least democratic branch
above the most democratic, he says; rather it is an exertion of popular will, as expressed in the
Constitution, against legislative will, as expressed in statutory law. The people against the
legislature; the court as the trusted guardian of the people’s will! 31 Both Publius and Wilson
suppose that the restraint of the legislative branch is consistent with democracy because the
restraining institutions are themselves fully democratic. But this is more than a little disingenuous,
for the presidency is partly monarchic (e.g., a unitary executive),32 while the court is significantly
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aristocratic (e.g., legal wisdom and life tenure). As with tacit consent, it seems that the people bind
themselves only indirectly and at a distance while more immediately they are bound by institutions
of a monarchic and aristocratic temper. All in all, America does betray some features of a mixed
regime,33 notwithstanding disclaimers that the government created is “purely democratical” (772,
303).34 These checks and balances may in fact produce lawfulness, but is the people’s liberty
surrendered in the process?
Were there much more of this, one might be tempted to locate Wilson entirely within the
company of Federalists, as someone who thought with Publius that the failings of democracy were
not to be corrected by more democracy.35 Publius says famously that he seeks a republican remedy
for the diseases most incident to republican government.36 What is meant by this profession is that
Publian proposals for the extended sphere, separation of powers, bicameralism, federalism,
representation, and a written constitution are compatible with popular sovereignty, not that they
are particular exercises thereof.37 As noted before, the Federalist Papers is mostly silent about the
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people’s ultimate right to rule.
Wilson’s democratic bona fides are most evident in his discussion of representation and
citizenship. Wilson accepts representation as an expedient necessary to large states—which is to
say that direct rule by the people would be preferable if contemporary states were as small as
ancient republics. Theoretically speaking, Wilson is a proponent of direct democracy, a position
starkly at variance with that taken by Publius and most other Federalists. But states are large, the
people cannot themselves assemble, and so the public business must be transacted by elected
officials. Still, the measure of their legitimacy is the difference obtaining “between that which is
done by the people in their own persons, and that which is done by their deputies” (405, 782,
790).38 “The legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society,”39 that way the
electorate will have confidence in their representatives; and “confidence,” says Wilson, sounding
a prominent Antifederalist theme, 40 “—mutual and endearing confidence—between those who
impart power and those to whom power is imparted, is the brightest gem in the diadem of a
republic” (791).
The one concession which Wilson makes to the Federalist view of representation is the size
of election districts: he would have them large so that “the choice will be more wise and
enlightened” (417) He is like Publius in wanting to rid elections of “the vicious arts by which
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elections are too often carried,”41 thinking that “intrigue and cunning . . . are most successful in a
contracted sphere” (417). At the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Wilson remarked that the
larger the district, “the greater the probability of selecting wise and virtuous characters.” 42 But
these characters—natural aristocrats—are nevertheless charged with expressing “the same
sentiments, which the represented, if possessed of equal information, would express” (406). Thus,
elected officials have limited authority to refine and enlarge the opinions of their constituents.
Might though the people work this refinement themselves? Wilson believes that the close
representation of the people’s views needs not result in selfish and shortsighted policies. The
reason is that the people are capable of quick improvement and can rise well above their customary
mediocrity. What mainly will effect this pedagogic transformation is the franchise, the basic
citizen’s right to vote. One striking feature of Wilson’s thought is the confidence he has in the
edifying properties of suffrage:
. . . the right of suffrage, properly understood, properly valued, properly cultivated,
and properly exercised, is a rich mine of intelligence and patriotism . . . an abundant
source of the most rational, the most improving, and the most endearing connexion
among citizens . . . and . . . a most powerful, and, at the same time a most pleasing
bond of union between the citizens, and those whom they select for the different
offices and departments of government (789; also 405).
Unfortunately, the right of suffrage has not in the past, nor yet in the present, been nearly so well
regarded. Wilson tries to excuse current reprobate practices of electioneering and the inattention
exhibited by the people—“the most important servants of the publick will be voted in without
consideration and without care” (157)—by noting that elections prior to the Revolution were
inconsiderable exercises confined to the staffing of but one branch of government over which two
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nonrepresentative branches fielded absolute vetoes (786). Because old habits die hard, there has
still been no improvement; but the “fond conjecture” is nonetheless entertained that elections will
soon come to be treated with the solemnity they deserve.
Wilson envisages from the act of voting the creation of a citizen who is
employed, on every convenient occasion, in making researches after proper persons
for filling the different departments of power; in discussing, with his neighbours
and fellow citizens, the qualities that should be possessed by those who fill the
several offices; and in acquiring information, with the spirit of manly candour,
concerning the manners, and history, and characters of those, who are likely to be
candidates for the publick choice. A habit of conversing and reflecting on these
subjects, and of governing his actions by the result of his deliberations, will form,
in the mind of the citizen, a uniform, a strong, and a lively sensibility to the interests
of his country . . . .
By these means, and in this manner, pure and genuine patriotism—that kind,
which consists in liberal investigation and disinterested conduct—is produced,
cherished, and strengthened in the mind (788).
Such reflective patriotism on the part of average citizens would answer many of the standard
objections against the agent theory of representation—unless of course there were smoldering
divisions within the body politic which earnest participation by citizens would flame into factions.
But Wilson does not much travel down this dark Madisonian byway. He seems to assume that the
community is homogeneous, enough so that the common interest is tantamount to the sum of
individual interests (790).43 He assumes, in other words, the essential compatibility of the interests
making up the aggregate. He even treats the people of the nation, when comparing them to a special
body of electors, as a single, unified group, and says that their interest more nearly approximates
the common good (789). It is not unreasonable to expect, therefore, that the active participation of
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patriotic and enlightened citizens, all of one kind, will be disciplined and lawful, and that popular
sovereignty will consequently be controlled.
Perhaps it seems that Wilson is drifting perilously close to Whig republicanism, pinning
democratic self-rule to the virtue of the citizen body.44 But in fact he is rather restrained in the
demands he places upon people. For instance, he describes citizenship modestly as a relaxation of
the bow of private industry. Citizens need not be public minded first, last, and always. “I
am far from insinuating,” he protests,
that every citizen should be an enthusiast in politicks, or that the interests of
himself, his family, and those who depend on him for their comfortable situation in
life, should be absorbed in Quixotic speculations about the management or the
reformation of the state. But there is surely a golden mean in things; and there can
be no real incompatibility between the discharge of one’s publick and that of his
private duty (787).
Apart from responsible voting, duty requires that the common advantage take precedence over
private interest. This may be difficult to achieve since “it is the nature of man, to pursue his own
interest, in preference to the public good.”45 But a well-constructed and impartially administered
state does not often face such a dilemma, Wilson asserts. And if burdens are needlessly imposed
or extended beyond what the emergency requires, the government is effectively a tyranny, with
revolution being a legitimate remedy. Personal sacrifices to the public good should thus be held to
a minimum, and, when normal conditions return, compensation should be paid. Wilson also notes
that citizens are obliged to respect the offices of state because public esteem is a principal
inducement for qualified people to come into government and faithfully execute its functions. Last,

44

Nedelsky takes this view, stating that Wilson’s understanding of popular sovereignty “demands a great deal of

the people” (Private Property, p. 111).
45

“An Address to a Mass Meeting at the State House in Philadelphia, 6th 33 October, 1787,” in Selected Essays

of James Wilson, ed. R.G. Adams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), p. 59.

24

and most obvious, it is the citizens’ duty to obey the laws. Here we reach the heart of the matter—
a sovereign people binding themselves by law. Their security, their liberty, and their dignity as
citizens, says Wilson, depend on self-government, or the capacity to rule and control themselves.
But it is not altruism or public spiritedness, as much as it is interest, that accounts for their capacity:
the people will obey the laws they make because those laws reflect their own interests (574-77).46
No resplendent virtue or uncommon wisdom is required, merely “a general identity of interest, and
a perfect equality of duties and rights” (575).

III. Conclusion
Wilson mixes together in his constitutional stew a concoction of disparate ingredients
designed to satisfy the mind’s appetite for lawful freedom, or for popular sovereignty coupled with
popular restraint. He takes human nature as his broth, claiming that it is instructed by a divinely
ordained law of nature. To some degree man is in easy harmony with this law and typically
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complies with its directives. But he is a free agent, and, if given the power, can certainly do as he
likes. Unfortunately, politics is always a matter of judging in one’s own case, of being party to the
controversy one is called upon to settle. Accordingly, “the sacred impartiality of [judges] . . . is
too frequently lost in the sordid interestedness of [parties], and in the arrogant power of
[legislators]” (578). When Wilson was a colonist contesting the asserted sovereignty of the British
Parliament, he asked cynically whether Americans should depend on British veneration for the
dictates of natural justice: “A very little share of experience in the world . . . will sufficiently
convince us, that a regard to justice is by no means the ruling principle in human nature” (734).
Something more fibrous than natural law seems needed to control the actions of men, and
so added to the constitutional stew is the meat of government. First, it is allowed that the essentials
of free government are in place if power is merely drawn from the people, not exercised by them
(791). The consent of the governed is thought to be given tacitly in some cases, with custom
accepted as a form of active consent. Next, the functions of government are separated, and the
legislature divided in two, so that the delays caused by the system of checks and balances will
leaven democratic self-rule with the wisdom and justice of aristocratic regimes. The patience of
the public is obtained by a tactical scattering of its allegiance—all branches discharge the public
will, even when they check the one body whose power is given directly and immediately by the
people.
The above qualifications to popular rule seem like pure Federalism. But Wilson strays from
the Federalist fold with his Antifederalist insistence that representatives be agents of their
constituents and that collectively they miniaturize the contours of society. Unlike Publius, Wilson
does not support the positive good of representative democracy—it rather is an unfortunate but
necessary consequence of the augmented size of modern nations. But this effort to invigorate the
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people’s sovereignty by representational populism runs the risk of loosening the self-restraints of
law. Here Wilson resorts not to an institutional corrective, but to the character of the people
themselves—hence come the vegetables which supply the stew its nutrition. Without expecting
Roman republicans on American soil, Wilson supposes that access to the res publica through the
right of suffrage will produce a body politic which is patriotic and enlightened, and that, combined
with the interest citizens have in obeying laws of their own devising, there will be sufficient
internal control to sustain the law-abidingness of a free and sovereign people.47
Two somewhat hidden facets of Wilson’s thought would appear now to be crucial—and
these are the spices of the stew which establish its singular flavor. One is that commerce unifies
rather than fragments society. America is a burgeoning commercial nation, and commerce will
make it an interdependent whole with basic interests shared by all (240-41).48 Although never
exactly saying so, Wilson seems convinced that the proper strategy is to attack the causes of faction
and not, as Publius argues, to encourage faction so as better to control its effects. In any event, a
factious society would upset the hope that, because people’s interests are uniform, they can
legislate fairly and observe the laws they enact. Also, it seems thought that commercial activity
will not become a privatizing vortex into which all public consciousness disappears.
The source of Wilson’s confidence—and the second facet of his thought—is the putative
nature of man as a progressive being and the power of a republican constitution to shape that nature
for the good. Nothing more clearly distinguishes Wilson from Whig republicanism, and from
Rousseau, than the conviction that civilization is progressive and that the arts and sciences improve
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rather than corrupt the morals of men (84, 146-47).49 Wilson even supposes that in the future public
opinion will be so enlightened as to make natural law an effective deterrent to injustice (578). As
for the influence of a good constitution, the effects it works on people, he declares, are remarkable
indeed. The knowledge that one is free, that the innocent are protected by law and the meritorious
esteemed, inspires him with “ardent affection for the publick” and stimulates “his strongest
patriotick exertions” (307). Thus, even in a commercial society, the expectation is that political
affairs can retain their rightful hold on the attentions of men.

Some fifty years after Wilson’s Lectures on Law, a French visitor pointed out the causal
connection between materialism and individualism. 50 Not long afterward the Civil War
conclusively established that the people of America were not united by a single interest. And
throughout our history it has been sadly evident that the right of suffrage is not the elixir that
Wilson hoped it would be. Wilson is sometimes lauded as the most prescient of the Founders, as
the man who best anticipated the democratic direction which the regime was destined to take.51
But on several key points, Wilson is wide of the mark. And the essential one, that the people’s
sovereignty be executed by look-alike representatives, is as troubling for Wilson’s own theory as
its implementation has been for succeeding generations. In the effort to provide a durable “chain
of communication” between the electorate and their officials, Wilson confesses that the qualities
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of the latter are not a matter of great importance: “If the materials, which form this chain, are sound
and strong; I shall not be very anxious about the degree to which they are polished” (786). On the
other hand, he lists it among the laws of nations that the management of a community’s affairs be
entrusted only to its “wisest and best citizens” (157, 289). Society needs its best people in high
office, and these people need the responsibilities of office to flourish. For Wilson, ambition is a
virtue, and a reputation honestly won is a primary right of men. At the Federal Convention he
offered a clue as to how he might reconcile the tension between the active sovereignty of the many
and the ambition of the few. When it was contended that the people wish to check the influence of
officials by making them ineligible for additional or successive offices, 52 Wilson replied in
opposition that were he to sacrifice his own judgment in order to flatter the prejudices of his
constituents, he would dread their likely retort: “Did you suppose the people of Pennsylvania had
not good sense enough to receive a good Government?”53 In other words, Wilson imputed to his
constituents the good sense of deferring to his better judgment. But one wonders how tenable this
position really is. Despite occasional overtures to natural aristocracy, Wilson’s theory of
representation depreciates the talent and contribution of elected officials; finally, it leads to
instructed delegates, mere ciphers of the people’s will. But a government so constituted would
hardly be attractive to, nor would find use for, men of exceptional ambition, such as Wilson
himself. It is often charged against Publius that he created a government which by its internal
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workings would have progressively less need for the statesmanlike wisdom of the Founding
generation.54 Wilson might similarly be charged, although not on grounds that the government is
too mechanistic, but rather that it is too egalitarian.
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